Introduction
The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 was signed into law by the President on May 28 th . Among several provisions, the reduction in the maximum statutory tax rate on dividends from 38 percent to 15 percent was perhaps the most dramatic and was almost certainly the most contentious. Indeed, the Senate passed the bill with a vote of 51-50, following weeks of wrangling, during which time it was unclear whether the Senate could pass a version of the bill that would contain anything close to the eventual reduction in dividend taxes. A related provision in the ultimate package was a reduction to the top statutory rate on long-term capital gains taxes from 20 percent to 15 percent, thereby equalizing those two tax rates for the first time since 1990.
The purported benefits of these provisions were manifold. It was argued that the reduction in the dividend tax rate would encourage more companies to pay dividends, which would facilitate both the redistribution of capital resources and corporate governance reform. Another purported benefit was that the reduction in taxes on investment income would lower the cost of capital to business, thereby stimulating more investment and job creation. This lower cost of capital would be effected through a rise in U.S. corporate equity prices, which, in turn, was expected to boost spending through the wealth effect.
In this paper, we test the hypothesis that the proposed cut in capital taxation boosted U.S. equity prices. We use an event-study methodology to compare the behavior of U.S. common stock prices to the prices of securities on which capital taxation should have seen little or no direct effect, such as stock prices of foreign firms, as well as the prices of equity securities on real estate investment trusts (REITs) . In addition, we analyze the impact of the news by examining cross-sectional differences in the response of stock prices, comparing in particular firms with different dividend policies.
In the final section, this paper examines the response of corporate dividend policy, which other studies have shown to be dramatic. The analysis here goes a couple steps further, in order to determine what factors might have influenced the varied level of responses to the new tax law, and to measure whether the positive dividend effect also represented a net boost to total corporate payouts or, instead, a substitution away from stock repurchases.
Summarizing our conclusion, we fail to find much, if any, imprint of the dividend tax cut news on the value of the aggregate stock market. Second, there appeared to have been modest but seemingly short-lived cross-sectional effects on stock valuations.
Finally, changes to payout policy following passage of the tax bill were systematically related to executive compensation structure but resulted in only a muted gain in total corporate payouts.
Announcement and Passage of a Dividend Tax Cut: A Narrative
For our formal analysis we define two narrow event windows when news on political developments presumably raised the likelihood that a substantial dividend tax cut would be enacted -the shaded areas in Figure 1 . The first event period surrounds Bush's January 7 speech to the Economics Club of Chicago, when the dividend tax cut proposal was officially unveiled (see the list of key event dates in Figure 1 ). Because the intention to propose a dividend tax cut was leaked in a January 3rd Washington Post article, the window spans January 3-9, capturing the period over which newspaper coverage initially spiked. One measure of media coverage is shown by the vertical bars in Figure 1 , which plot the daily number of news stories containing the topic of "dividends" and "taxes" in the 15 largest U.S. newspapers. The number of such stories quickly subsided during February through April as legislation made scant progress and the public focused on the prospect of war in Iraq.
The issue became a prime news story again in early May, following reports that Over the January 3-9 window, the S&P 500 and the Russell 2000 small-cap index rose about 2 percent and 1 percent, respectively. Over the May 14-28 window, the S&P 500 rose 1.2 percent, while the small-cap index rose 2.7 percent. (Including May 6-13 would boost the second-window returns to 2.9 and 5 percent, respectively.) Of course, the aggregate market could have been buffeted by other, very unfavorable news during those windows; thus, the analysis to follow examines excess returns across markets or in 4 the cross-section of U.S. stocks in order to gauge the effect of the dividend tax cut on equity valuations.
Broad Market Evidence
Although our empirical analysis of the effects of the 2003 dividend tax cut on the stock market takes on several guises, the methodology is similar in all cases. In this section, we present three tests contrasting the change in value of a portfolio of U.S.
common stocks that currently (or prospectively) generate taxable dividend streams with the change in value of a control portfolio of securities during the two event windows. In each case, the tax cut legislation under consideration can be reasonably presumed to have little or no direct effect on the valuation of the control portfolio. Thus, by examining the relative returns on U.S. common stocks, we can in principle control for the effects of general economic news.
Our first two tests compare U.S. stock market returns with returns on foreign equities. The prospect of the dividend tax cut would be applicable only to investors subject to the U.S. tax law, and U.S. investors hold a relatively small fraction of foreign equities -between 10 to 15 percent in most European markets. 2 In addition, the benefit of the tax cut to a U.S. owner of foreign stocks is typically far less than the benefit received on U.S. company dividends because the U.S. taxpayer's overall tax liability on a foreign stock equals the maximum of the U.S. and foreign country dividend tax rates. As an alternative to using foreign markets as a control, we next consider a class of U.S. assets whose dividends were specifically excluded from the 2003 tax cut. Real estate investment trusts (REITs) do not pay taxes on their profits at the corporate level if they distribute at least 90% of their taxable profits to their investors. Although such distributions are commonly referred to as "dividends," their tax-free pass-through to investors made them ineligible for the lower dividend tax rate. Consequently, if the 7 dividend tax cut boosted the valuation of (eligible) common stocks, one would expect REIT returns to have underperformed those equity shares over the event windows; that is, abnormal REIT returns should have been negative.
As shown in the top panels of Figure 4 , REIT prices (dotted green line) generally tracked the overall market for most of the event windows, even after the reconciled version of the tax legislation passed the Senate-House conference and the tax treatment of REIT distributions was made clear. Only on the day before the bill was signed into law did REIT shares decline sharply, and then only temporarily. The lower panels of Figure   4 examine the cumulative abnormal REIT returns (relative to S&P 500 returns).
Abnormal returns are near zero during the event windows and well within the estimated error bounds and are modestly positive by the end of July. Having found little measurable effect of the dividend tax cut on aggregate U.S. stock valuations, in the next section we attempt to determine whether the legislation had any significant crosssectional effects on U.S. stock valuations.
Cross-sectional Evidence
In the simplest of worlds without uncertainty, and where corporate net income is eventually paid out as dividends, a once-and-for-all cut in the dividend tax rate would have a similar positive valuation effect on all common stocks, regardless of their current dividend yield. Perhaps the most obvious complication is the recognition of uncertainty about the permanence of any tax reform, given the frequency of such changes over the past 75 years. Moreover, the 2003 law and its early incarnations explicitly embedded sunset provisions. Indeed, the reduced dividend tax rate will expire in 2008, absent additional legislative action. Together with growing budget deficits and changeable political priorities, the sunset provision undoubtedly added to the usual degree of uncertainty about the duration of the benefit. Uncertainty regarding the permanence of a dividend tax cut should dampen the positive valuation effect on all stocks, but more so on stocks for which the lion's share of dividends will be paid far into the future -stocks that currently pay little or no dividend.
Accordingly, we look for cross-sectional effects of the proposed dividend tax cut by splitting our sample of more than 2800 firms into four groups based on their dividend yield in 2002, shown in Table 1 . As noted, just over half of the firms did not pay any dividend in 2002. We define high-dividend firms as those for which the ratio of 2002 dividends to end-of-year price ("dividend yield") is greater than 3 percent, about a fifth of the dividend-payers. Medium-dividend firms have a dividend yield between 1 and 3 percent, while low-dividend firms are those with a dividend yield of less than 1 percent.
Summary statistics for each group are presented in Table 1 . The zero-dividend firms are notably smaller, more investment intensive, and less debt reliant than the other groups.
The top panels of Figure 5 show the cumulative realized returns for each group (equal-weighted) over the two event periods. The cumulative return ranged between 1 and 2 percent during the January 2003 event window for each group. During the May event period, the high-dividend and zero-dividend portfolios logged gains of approximately five percent, somewhat more than the other portfolios. 9 Because risk characteristics probably vary systematically across these groups, we test for differential performance by computing abnormal returns using the Fama-French three-factor model estimated over a twelve month period that includes the six months prior and subsequent to the event period. Conclusions are insensitive to choice of the factor estimation period.
As seen in the bottom panels of Figure 5 , the high-dividend portfolio generated abnormal returns of around 1 percent in the January window and 2-3/4 percent in the May window. Interestingly, in the latter period, it appears that high-dividend stocks began to diverge from low-and medium-dividend stocks on May 14 th , a pattern that persisted until the day before the legislation was signed. As Table 2 shows formally, in columns 3 and 4, the abnormal returns of the high-dividend firms over both event windows are statistically different from zero and from the abnormal returns of the lowdividend firms. Even so, Figure 5 also shows that this performance differential is not persistent, and by July it has dissipated entirely.
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9 Results are qualitatively similar for value weighting. 10 One interpretation is an appeal to temporary illiquidity; a quick response by alert tax-sensitive investors might have been eventually arbitraged away by nontaxable investors making offsetting portfolio changes.
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On the other hand, the bottom panel of Figure 5 also shows that firms at the other end of the payout spectrum -zero-dividend firms -logged positive abnormal returns of 1-1/2 percent in the May window, which are marginally statistically significant. These results seem to present a puzzle. The positive abnormal returns on stocks with higher current dividend yield is consistent with theoretical predictions of the effect of a temporary tax cut for firms currently paying dividends. Yet, the out-performance of zero-dividend stocks relative to low-dividend stocks over the tax-cut event window seems to cast some doubt on that interpretation.
One possibility is that the abnormal returns on zero-dividend stocks are spurious.
In particular, it appears from the chart that, unlike high-dividend firms, the abnormal performance of zero-dividend firms does not appear to be tied to the event period, but rather runs almost continuously from mid-April through July. This suggests that something else may be driving this result; for instance, the risk-factor model used to estimate normal returns for these firms could be substantially mis-specified.
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Nonetheless, we consider this seemingly anomalous result in more detail. One explanation for a positive, and potentially larger, response of zero-dividend share prices to a dividend tax cut is proposed by Auerbach and Hassett (2005) . They presume that zero-dividend firms will need to issue equity in the future because such firms will be unable to satisfy their large investment needs with internal funds or by issuing interestbearing debt. Current shareholders then reap the windfall on dividends to be paid on shares yet to be issued, causing an inflated response of the prospective issuer's current market value to a cut in dividend taxes.
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One approach to testing this explanation is to identify those zero-dividend firms that are likely to be truly equity-issuance dependent and compare their abnormal returns to other zero-dividend firms for which this story seems less plausible. We show one such experiment in Figure 6 . Here, we compare the abnormal returns of (zero-dividend paying) firms that used some of their cash to repurchase shares in recent years to the 10 abnormal returns of those firms that did not repurchase shares. The basic hypothesis is that firms that have been repurchasing shares are less likely to be cash-flow constrained and thus less likely to be anticipating a need to issue equity in the future.
As can be seen, there is virtually no difference between the abnormal performance of zero-dividend firms that have repurchased shares and those that have not done so.
Furthermore, as detailed in the Appendix, an examination of equity issuance by zero dividend firms since the tax cut indicates that the split by repurchase activity is a valid instrument, or predictor, of future equity issuance: zero-dividend firms that have recently bought back their stock were less likely to issue equity in the future compared to (zerodividend) firms that did not repurchased shares. This result casts further doubt on the above-mentioned rationale for the apparent positive abnormal event-window returns by zero-dividend firms. 
Pay-out Policy Evidence
Several studies have documented that, over the four quarters following the passage of the tax cut, there was a marked rise in the number of special dividends, initiations of new regular dividends, and large increases in regular dividends. This is illustrated in Figure 7 , where the number of dividend initiations by publicly-traded firms, and the four-quarter growth in the amount of dividends paid per share by S&P 500 firms, spike in the quarter immediately following the tax cut, and remain persistently high for several quarters thereafter.
To explain the cross-sectional response of dividend increases to the tax cut and to assess the effect of the tax-law change, we relate dividend increases to a number of explanatory variables and contrast results for 2003 with those for the previous decade.
after-tax value of $1 in dividends rising from 65 cents to 85 cents. 15 In contrast, executives that are compensated primarily with executive stock options almost never receive dividends paid on shares; thus, they see only the downside effect of a boost in dividends on the value of their options. Consequently, executives with options have an extra incentive to limit dividends, which was unaffected by the change in tax laws.
Our analysis is based on firms in the S&P 1500, a large proportion of publicly traded companies, excluding very small-cap firms. Overall, 31 percent of the firms in our sample initiated or increased dividends in 2003 (Table 3, Coefficient estimates on stock and option holdings for top executives suggest that the effect of the tax cut on dividend policy was strongest at firms where the executive's personal financial gains were most positively affected by the tax cut (Table 4) . As shown in column 1, the coefficient on executive share holdings is positive and significant, whereas the coefficient on options held is negative and significant. A sense of the magnitude of these effects is most easily inferred from the second specification, where the key independent variable is the ratio of shares held to the total number of shares and options held. The coefficient of 19.6 indicates, for instance that raising that ratio by 0.5 (well within the relevant range) would increase the probability of a dividend increase by 9.8 percent (19.6*0.5).
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In columns 3 and 4, we look at dividend initiations alone, which are generally seen as more dramatic announcements than a simple dividend increase. The coefficient on the ratio of shares to shares plus options in the column 4 regression is 12.9. That would imply that shifting the compensation ratio by 0.5 would increase the likelihood of a dividend initiation by 6½ percentage points, which is quite substantial relative to an average 2003 initiation probability of 7 percent.
A second question we consider is the effect of the tax law change on total payouts. Higher dividends will result in higher payouts only if firms do not simply shift to dividends what would have been paid out as share repurchases. 16 In table 5, we examine both dividends and share repurchases for those firms that increased dividends.
As shown in the top row of the upper panel, we find that among firms initiating dividends above, these results indicate that, for many firms, the increase in dividends came at the expense of repurchases. In additional analysis (not shown here), we examine the effect of executive compensation on total payout, and find that, despite their proclivity to increase dividends, firms with greater executive stock holdings were not more apt to increase total payouts.
Overall, the analysis of payout behavior indicates that the dividend tax cut did prompt a substitution from repurchases to dividends, but the effect on total payouts was 16 The tax bill not only cut the top marginal rate on dividends from 35 to 15 percent, but it also cut the capital gains rate that applies to share repurchases from 20 to 15 percent. As a result, repurchases are still tax-advantaged because the tax is deferred until the capital gains are realized, although the advantage is considerably smaller. If firms had been paying out with share repurchases and switched to dividends, the tax burden actually might not fall. 17 We also compared share repurchases and payouts during the year a firm increased dividends to the firm's average level of dividends and repurchases over the past three years (as opposed to just the prior year). The results regarding dividend substitution are very similar. For example, only 58% of dividend-initiators in 2003 increased total payouts above their average payout-to-assets ratio over the past three years (79% of dividend-initiators over the period 1993-2002 increased payouts relative to the prior three-year average).
13 much more muted. Apparently, firms for which the higher tax burden on dividends was an impinging factor had used share repurchases as tax-advantaged alternative. With an equalization of statutory rates, such firms became more willing to substitute towards dividends and scale back repurchases, leaving total payouts little changed. Dividend Initiations and Growth 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
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